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Abstract
The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackel-
berg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect infor-
mation and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not
rely on any specific properties of a particular game model. The method
is based on iterative interleaving of the two following phases: (1) guided
Monte Carlo Tree Search sampling of the Follower’s strategy space and
(2) building the Leader’s behavior strategy tree for which the sampled
Follower’s strategy is an optimal response. The above solution scheme is
evaluated with respect to expected Leader’s utility and time requirements
on three sets of interception games with variable characteristics, played on
graphs. A comparison with three state-of-the-art MILP/LP-based meth-
ods shows that in vast majority of test cases proposed simulation-based
approach leads to optimal Leader’s strategies, while excelling the com-
petitive methods in terms of better time scalability and lower memory
requirements.
1 Introduction
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) Leitmann (1978) defines equilibrium profile for
two-player asymmetric games. One player – the Leader – commits to a certain
strategy and the other player – the Follower – defines his/her strategy being
aware of the Leader’s commitment. The notion of SE, which originated in the
field of economy, gained momentum in recent decade thanks to intensive research
on Security Games Sinha et al. (2018) which often use Stackelberg Game (SG)
to model interactions between a defender (playing the role of a Leader) and an
attacker (being a Follower). We consider the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
(SSE) Leitmann (1978) in which (additionally to SE) the Follower breaks ties
in favor of the Leader when calculating the optimal response.
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Majority of contemporary SG research is focused on developing effective
methods for specific games, e.g. Brazdil et al. (2018); Schlenker et al. (2016);
Basilico et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2018); Johnson et al. (2012) and there are
just a few works related to finding SE in the case of general SG models.
1.1 Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is a method for approximating SE in a
broad and general genre of sequential general-sum imperfect-information games,
inspired by a double-oracle approach Bosansky et al. (2014); Jain et al. (2011).
Despite being rooted in the double-oracle framework, the proposed method
presents an entirely different operational principle than those of Bosansky et al.
(2014); Jain et al. (2011) as it relies on iterative Monte Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS) Browne et al. (2012) sampling of the Follower’s strategy alternated
with an adjustment of the Leader’s behavior strategy represented in the form
of a tree.
Proposed method is experimentally proven to yield close-to-optimal de-
fender’s strategies while scaling better in time and memory usage than com-
petitive MILP (Mixed Integer Linear Program) based approaches.
To the best of our knowledge there is only one other approach that uti-
lizes MCTS method to solve general-sum extensive-form SGs Karwowski and
Man´dziuk (2015, 2016, 2019) which, however, adopts a different protocol and
relies on iterative adjustment of the Leader’s strategy by means of direct MCTS
sampling against gradually changing Follower’s strategy. This method, though,
could not be applied to solve games with complex information set (IS) struc-
tures, e.g. Search Games Bosansky and Cermak (2015) considered in this paper.
1.2 Related Work
In the literature, the problem of finding SE is usually considered in the context
of some particular game model and therefore majority of proposed approaches
are model-specific and cannot be straightforwardly applied to other kinds of
SGs. On a general note, existing solution methods usually adapt and tune one
of the following well-established techniques: column and constraint generation
– e.g. Wang et al. (2018); Jain et al. (2010); marginal and compact strategies
– exploiting a particular structure of a game and its payoffs, e.g. Kiekintveld
et al. (2009); Schlenker et al. (2016); or game abstraction – e.g. Wang et al.
(2018); Basak et al. (2016). Utilization of these techniques requires tailoring
a solution method to characteristic game properties, what leads to a highly
efficient, though game-dedicated algorithm.
An efficient exact approach to generic sequential general-sum SGs was pro-
posed in Bosansky and Cermak (2015) where the authors considered a sequence-
form representation of a sequential game to improve scalability of a correspond-
ing MILP. Another powerful general approach, introduced by Cermak et al.
(2016) starts off with finding Stackelberg Extensive Form Correlated Equilib-
rium of a game using MILP and then restricts it iteratively until the obtained
strategy profile corresponds to SE. Yet another general approach to extensive-
form games Cerny et al. (2018) starts from a smaller (restricted) game and
gradually expands the game tree to compute the SSE. These three state-of-the-
art generic methods are used as reference points in experimental evaluation of
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the approximate approach proposed in this paper.
Our method (referred to as O2UCT – double-oracle UCT sampling) relies
on a guided sampling of the Follower’s strategy space and finding a feasible
Leader’s strategy using double-oracle method and does not involve solving Lin-
ear Program (LP) of any kind. Application of O2UCT leads to scalability
performance boost similar to that of using column and constraint generation
method in LP/MILP, albeit with no direct reference to any specific game model
properties, in the solution method.
2 Imperfect Information Stackelberg Games
A sequential non-zero-sum game with imperfect information can be defined
using an extensive form. An Extensive Form (EF) game is an 8-tuple G =
(N ,S,Z, ρ,A, u, T , I), where N = {L,F} is a set of players (the Leader and
the Follower in the case of a two player SG). S and Z are sets of non-terminal
and terminal game states, resp., ρ : S → N is a function defining which player
acts in a given state. A = ⋃s∈S As is a family of sets As, where As is a set of
all actions available to an active player in state s. u : {Z × N} → [0, 1] is a
utility function which provides utilities for all players in terminal states. T is a
set of transition functions Ts : As → S ∪ Z such that for every s ∈ S, Ts(a) is
a state resulting from playing action a in state s. I is a family of information
sets Ik ⊆ S which satisfies the standard definition Kuhn (1950).
Moreover, all considered games have perfect recall property, i.e. an active
player is fully aware of his/her past actions and ISs he/she encountered before
reaching the current state.
Let’s denote by AIk a set of actions available in a given information set Ik
and by In a family of information sets in which player n is an active player. A
pure strategy of player n (denoted by pin) is an assignment of one of the allowed
actions per each IS in In. A mixed strategy δn is a probability distribution over
all possible pure strategies pin of player n. In EF games a behavior strategy is
additionally defined, as a function that assigns a probability distribution over
all available actions to each IS. In perfect recall games mixed and behavior
strategies are pairwise equivalent Kuhn (1950) and therefore in the remainder
of the paper we will denote behavior strategies of player n by δn and treat them
equivalently to mixed strategies.
We will use the notation EUnδF ,δL to denote the expected utility of player n
(L – Leader, F – Follower) when the Leader and the Follower play strategies δL
and δF , respectively. An index referring to the Leader’s strategy will be omitted
in the contexts in which it does not lead to misunderstandings.
3 Double-oracle sampling method (O2UCT) for
SE approximation
In order to find SE in a perfect recall imperfect-information deterministic multi-
act general-sum game the following iterative procedure, depicted in Fig. 1, is
applied. In each iteration, in the first step the Follower’s strategy is sampled
with a method capable of using the results from previous iterations to guide
subsequent sampling. Next, a method for finding the Leader’s strategy, for
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Sample Follower’s strategy
in a guided manner
Step 1
Apply UCT selection,
expansion & simulation
to AFG
Repeat for a pre-defined number of iterations:
Calculate Leaders’s
strategy
Step 2
Consider moves on the path from the root to
the leaf in the AFG to be a pure Follower’s strategy
and apply procedure from Section 3.1
Collect game payoffs
and use them to guide
subsequent sampling
Backpropagate the Leader’s
payoff in the UCT tree.
Step 3
calculate payoffs
Figure 1: An outline of the O2UCT method. Oval frames present the method’s
general idea, while rectangular dashed frames summarize particular realization
of each step proposed in this work. Implementation of Step 2, which is the most
challenging part of O2UCT, is described in more detail in Fig. 4.
which the just-sampled Follower’s strategy is the optimal response,
is applied. In the third step utility values corresponding to obtained strategy
profile are collected to adjust the guided sampling procedure (Step 1) in the
next iteration.
A distinctive feature of the proposed method is the lack of exhaustive search
of the Follower’s strategy space, which is replaced by an iterative guided space
sampling procedure.
In order to perform this sampling an Auxiliary Follower’s Game (AFG) is
formulated, which is a one-player game that yields the Follower’s restricted pure
strategy (also called restricted pure realization plan in EF games) when reaching
a terminal state of AFG. AFG is constructed based on the original EF game in
the following way:
• The current AFG state is represented in the form of a queue of the Fol-
lower’s ISs (from the original ES game). Initially the queue contains ISs
observable by the Follower before their first move.
• Each game round consists in taking the first IS from the queue, playing
one of the moves available in that IS and placing in the queue all ISs that
may results from the current IS after playing the selected move (i.e. all
ISs for which there exists a Leader’s strategy directly leading to them).
• The game is played until the queue is empty.
The moves played on the path from the root of AFG to its leaf define a pure
Follower’s strategy in the original EF game. An example transformation of
two-player EF game to one-player AFG is presented in Fig. 2.
In principle, there are no formal requirements for a sampling heuristic method
to be used, except for the ability to transfer knowledge related to the sampled
space to subsequent iterations. In the experiments an MCTS Browne et al.
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Figure 2: An example of AFG construction. Original two-player EF game (on
the left) and the resulting one-player AFG (on the right). Rectangles in the
bottom part of the figure present a state of a queue in states I ′1, I
′
2 and I
′
3,
respectively assuming that a path in AFG which is currently considered by the
algorithm is the leftmost one. Signs + and − represent push and pop operations
in the queue, resp.
(2012) variant called Upper Confidence Bound applied to Trees (UCT) pro-
posed by Kocsis and Szepesva´ri Kocsis and Szepesva´ri (2006) was applied to
guide the Follower’s strategy space sampling process by means of finding the
optimal strategy in AFG, as described in the next section.
In short, each MCTS/UCT iteration (playout) is composed of 4 main phases:
selection, expansion, simulation, and backpropagation (please consult Kocsis and
Szepesva´ri (2006) or Browne et al. (2012) for a detailed description). In our
method, selection, expansion and simulation correspond to the first step of an
O2UCT iteration (guided sampling) and backpropagation phase is implemented
in its third step (collection of payoffs). The second step in Fig. 1 refers to
reaching the leaf node (a final state of the AFG) and obtaining the Leader’s
payoff. This payoff is equal to the expected payoff of playing the Leader’s
strategy and is calculated using a method presented in Section 3.1.
UCT is a powerful and versatile metaheuristic which has proven success-
ful in a wide variety of optimization problems, including General Game Play-
ing S´wiechowski et al. (2016), playing classical board games Silver et al. (2017),
proactive planning under uncertainty Wale¸dzik and Man´dziuk (2018) or combi-
natorial optimization Sabharwal et al. (2012).
The most challenging part of O2UCT is an algorithm (described below)
which for the current Follower’s strategy pif finds the respective Leader’s strat-
egy δl for which pif is an optimal response. The final outcome of O2UCT is a
pair of strategies (δl, pif ) providing the highest Leader’s payoff found across all
iterations.
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3.1 A method of finding the Leader’s strategy
The method utilizes a tree structure representation of the Leader’s behavior
strategy which has the following properties.
• Each node is labeled with the Leader’s IS and contains a vector of proba-
bilities of actions available in this IS.
• Root node represents the initial Leader’s IS.
• Edges going out of any node are labeled with pairs (a, I ′), where a is an
action and I ′ is an IS reachable by playing a in a given node.
Please note that several ISs may be reachable after playing the same move,
depending on an opponent’s response. Such a situation is depicted in Fig. 3
presenting an example tree in which playing move m6 may lead to either one of
the two ISs (s9 or sa) depending on a move played by the opponent. Initially,
the tree does not contain all ISs, but only those reachable by an initial strategy
profile. Subsequent nodes are added gradually, as explained below.
The algorithm for finding the Leader’s strategy is inspired by a double-oracle
approach Bosansky et al. (2014); Jain et al. (2011) and consists of alternating
the following two phases: (1) an improvement of the Leader’s strategy against a
fixed Follower and (2) finding the optimal Follower’s response against the current
Leader’s strategy – based on the Follower’s oracle. For a sampled Follower’s
strategy (Step 1 in Fig. 1) a corresponding Leader’s strategy (Step 2 in Fig. 1)
must satisfy the following conditions:
(*) the optimal Follower’s response to that strategy is the same as the sampled
Follower’s strategy,
(**) among all Leader’s strategies that satisfy the above constraint it is the
one that optimizes the Leader’s payoff.
Any Leader’s strategy satisfying (*) will be called a feasible strategy (a set of
feasible strategies is also called a best response region in von Stengel and Zamir
(2004)).
Let us denote the sampled Follower’s strategy by pirF (r stands for the re-
quested Follower’s strategy). An overview of the method of finding the Leader’s
strategy that fulfills constraints (*)–(**) is presented in Fig. 4 and consists of
the following steps:
1. Initialize the Leader’s strategy.
2. Seek the Follower’s strategy yielding better Follower’s payoff against the
current Leader’s strategy using the algorithm described in Section 3.2. If
such strategy exists call it pibF (b stands for better (in terms of payoff)
Follower’s strategy).
3. If pibF was found, then perform strategy feasibility pass (see below) and go
to 2, otherwise continue.
4. If stopping condition is not met, perform the Leader’s strategy adjustment
that increases the Leader’s payoff (positive pass - see below) and go to 2,
otherwise continue.
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Figure 3: An example of the Leader’s behavior strategy tree. Nodes represent
the Leader’s ISs. Edges are labeled with pairs (move, probability). Playing
some moves (e.g. m6) may lead to various ISs (s9 or sa, resp.), depending on
the Follower’s action.
5. Return the best Leader’s strategy among all feasible strategies found in
step (3).
The Leader’s strategy tree is initialized as a single path representing a move
sequence maximizing the Leader’s payoff against pirF . This sequence is found
based on a limited number of UCT simulations. All adjustments to the Leader’s
strategy are performed on a common (continuously evolving) tree-based repre-
sentation. In Fig. 4 there are two procedures in which these strategy updates
occur: feasibility pass and positive pass. The first one is executed when the
current Leader’s strategy becomes infeasible, i.e. there exists pibF that yields
higher Follower’s payoff than pirF . The latter one is run to improve the Leader’s
payoff in the case of feasible (Leader’s) strategy. In both cases the same proce-
dure, presented in Algorithms 1 and 2, is applied to update the Leader’s strategy
tree. The only difference lies in a move assessment subroutine which is explained
below.
Algorithm 1 starts off from the root node of the Leader’s strategy tree and
recursively descends to every leaf node of the tree. In each step of recursion one
node of the tree, denoted by nc, is processed. While in nc, the algorithm first
recursively calls itself for all child nodes of nc. Once adjustment of these nodes
(changes in probabilities of available moves) is completed, if there exist moves
that are available to play from the IS corresponding to nc in the game, but not
represented in the tree, a node representing one of them is added to the tree
with some probability (equal to 0.3 in the experiments) together with a path
expanded from this newly-added node until a leaf node. Next, Algorithm 2 is
applied to nc.
The role of Algorithm 2 is to accumulate direction of strategy changes in
two passes: positive and feasibility. A momentum vector is used to store the
resultant strategy adjustment stemming from those two passes. The algorithm
uses a node assessment vector (as ∈ RM ) to indicate a direction of adjust-
ment of the Leader’s strategy and implements this adjustment based on the
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Initialize Leader’s
mixed strategy
Sampled Follower’s
strategy (Fig. 1, Step 1)
Does better
Follower’s strategy
exist?
Adjust Leader’s strate-
gy to lower pibF payoff
compared to pirF (‡)
Feasibility pass
Found
pibF
Stop condition?
Not found
Improve Leader’s payoff
against pirF (†)
Positive pass
No
Return best feasible
Leader’s strategy
Yes
Store best Leader’s strategy
pirF
Fig. 1, Step 3
Leader’s payoff
Figure 4: An overview of the method of finding Leader’s mixed strategy corre-
sponding to the requested Follower’s strategy. Procedures marked in red adjust
the current Leader’s strategy. Blue labels refer to the names of procedures used
in the text. Dashed boxes indicate connection points to the sampling procedure
depicted in Fig. 1.
resultant direction accumulated in all previous iterations in a momentum vector
(mom ∈ RM ). First, the momentum vector is updated by adding the assess-
ment vector. A positive value in the assessment vector results in increasing the
preference for the respective move, a negative one results in decreasing this pref-
erence. Next, a normalization factor (w ∈ R) is increased by adding L1 norm
of assessment vector, to confine mom/w to interval [−1, 1]. Then the vector of
move probabilities is updated with normalized mom values and normalized to
represent a proper probability distribution.
The last element of the method of finding the Leader’s strategy is calculation
of the assessment vector (as) used in Algorithm 2, which is pass-dependent.
• In positive pass the goal is to maximize the Leader’s payoff. Consequently,
as value for move ai: asi = EULpirF (ai) − EULpirF is a difference between
the Leader’s expected payoff when move ai is played in the current state
and an expected payoff when moves are played according to the current
probabilities (Leader’s mixed strategy). The higher the result of playing
ai compared to the expected result arising from the current probabilities,
the greater the asi value.
• In feasibility pass the goal is to modify the Leader’s strategy in a way
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Algorithm 1: Strategy tree adjustment procedure
Data: nc – a node of a strategy tree currently processed, M – a set of
all moves that are added to the tree in nc, Ik – an IS
corresponding to nc, AIk – a set of all moves in Ik.
1 foreach m←M do
2 recursively adjust successor of nc after playing m against pi
b
F in
feasibility pass or pirF in positive pass
3 end
4 if (rand() ≤ 0.3) ∧ (AIk \M 6= ∅) then
5 expand tree with one move a′ ∈ AIk \M
6 end
7 perform adjustment of nc as described in Algorithm 2;
Algorithm 2: Node adjustment with momentum
Data: prob ∈ [0, 1]M – a vector of probabilities, mom ∈ RM – a
momentum vector, w ∈ R – a momentum normalization factor,
as ∈ RM – an assessment vector. In each vector the i-th position
corresponds to the i-th move.
1 mom← mom+ as;
2 w ← w + L1(as);
3 prob← max{prob+mom/w, 0}// independent max at each position
4 prob← normalizeOrEqualprob// Normalize vector values so
their sum is 1 or, as a fallback, assign equal probability
at each position in case all positions equal 0
that pirF will become the corresponding best response strategy. Hence, if
the current IS is reachable when playing against both pirF and pi
b
F , then
asi = (EUFpirF (ai)−EUFpibF (ai))−(EU
F
pirF
−EUF
pibF
), i.e. asi is higher for moves
that give better result against pirF than against pi
b
F .
If the current IS is reachable only when playing against pibF , then asi =
EUF
pibF
−EUF
pibF
(ai). Note that an order of subtraction operands is reversed
compared to a similar equation in the positive pass. Here, the weaker the
Follower’s payoff when the Leader plays move ai, the higher the value of
asi because the goal is to discourage the Follower from playing strategy
pibF .
3.1.1 Stopping condition
The algorithm depicted in Fig. 4 stops when one of the following conditions is
reached: a number of executions of step (†) exceeds Lmax = 5000, an improve-
ment of the Leader’s payoff in 500 subsequent iterations is less than εI = 10
−5,
or a number of subsequent executions of step (‡) without going to step (†) ex-
ceeds Mmax = 10000 (infeasible strategy). Values of all steering parameters
were selected based on a limited number of preliminary tests.
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3.2 Follower’s strategy oracle
Implementation of the above-mentioned algorithm requires an ability to find
the Follower’s strategy that yields better Follower’s payoff against the current
Leader’s strategy.
The most straightforward approach, suitable for any EF game, would be to
iterate through all possible Follower’s strategies and choose the one with the
highest expected payoff. Such an approach, however, is excessively slow and in
practice hinders application of the method to games longer than 4 steps. In order
to address this issue our implementation avoids enumeration of all Follower’s
strategies in the following way:
• Between any two consecutive questions to the oracle about the best re-
sponse strategy, a collection of Q pairs (n, piF ) is maintained, where n is
the use counter and piF is the Follower’s pure strategy (Q = 50 was used
in the experiments).
• When asked about a better Follower’s strategy the algorithm first iterates
over Follower’s strategies from the above-mentioned collection. If there
exists a strategy that yields better Follower’s payoff than pirF by more
than εO (equal to 10
−2 in the experiments), then this strategy is returned
and its use counter is incremented. Otherwise:
1. If the collection is filled up (contains Q strategies), a strategy with
the smallest use counter is removed.
2. Full enumeration of the Follower’s strategies is performed and the
best one is selected and added to the collection with n = 1.
4 Experimental evaluation
Evaluation of O2UCT was performed on three game sets: Warehouse Games
proposed in Karwowski and Man´dziuk (2019), its modified version with more
diverse payoffs, and Search Games used in Bosansky and Cermak (2015).
4.1 Warehouse Games (WHG)
WHG model interactions between the attacker and the defender in a ware-
house/office building. A game graph includes the following three types of dis-
tinguished vertices: one defender’s starting point, one attacker’s starting point,
and several asset locations (targets). The game is sequential and in each turn
each of the players can either stay in the current vertex or move to any adja-
cent vertex. A full description of a game model is presented in Karwowski and
Man´dziuk (2019). In the experiments 25 WHG instances were used.
4.2 Modified Warehouse Games (WNZ)
WHG setting is relatively close to zero-sum games, the average Pearson’s cor-
relation between the Leader’s and the Follower’ payoffs equals −0.82. To pro-
vide a more challenging setting we used a game generator from Karwowski and
Man´dziuk (2019) to obtain benchmark games with more diverse payoffs. The
following ranges for uniform distributions were applied: attacker’s penalty in
10
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Figure 5: Example WNZ graph. All games are defined on a 4 × 4 grid. Rect-
angular vertices are targets, a triangle vertex is evader’s starting point, a blue
circle vertex is defender’s starting point. Values denote payoffs for the evader
and the defender, resp. in the case of evader’s interception in a given vertex.
Additional utilities, in case of successful attack, are assigned in targets (the
second column).
Figure 6: Search Games graph.
targets: [−1, 0.2] and regular vertices: [−1, 0] (when caught by the defender),
attacker’s reward in targets: [−0.2, 1] and the corresponding defender’s penalty
in targets: [−1, 0.2] (successful attack). Defender’s reward (for catching the
attacker) in non-target and target vertices was fixed at 0.1 and 0.2, resp. If
the game ended due to reaching the round limit, with no interception of the
attacker or reaching a target by him/her, a neutral payoff of 0 was assigned to
both players. A set of 25 games was generated with the above parameters con-
sisting of games that are less zero-sum like – the average Pearson’s correlation
for this set equals −0.57. An example WNZ graph is depicted in Fig. 5.
4.3 Search Games (SEG)
SEG instances were built on a graph presented in Fig. 6 previously used in Bosan-
sky and Cermak (2015). Five sets of payoff values in the target vertices for each
of the two variants of an attacker’s mobility restrictions (in the first one the
attacker can wait in a vertex, in the other one he/she is forced to move in each
round) were generated. In each case, game variants with T = 4, 5 and 6 were
considered leading to 30 test instances in total.
Similarly to Bosansky and Cermak (2015), the following distributions of
payoffs were used in the tests. In case of catching the attacker the reward
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for the defender equaled 1 and the penalty for the attacker was equal to −1.
The attacker’s rewards in targets in case of a successful attack were sampled
uniformly from [1, 2] and the respective defender’s penalty was equal to −1.
Otherwise, when the game ended due to reaching the step limit T , a neutral
payoff equal to 0 was assigned to each side.
4.4 Experimental setup
In the following description BC2015 refers to the method from Bosansky and
Cermak (2015), C2016 to approach from Cermak et al. (2016) (a variant AI-
MILP was used) and CBK2018 to the method from Cerny et al. (2018) which,
following suggestions from the authors, is implemented in two variants: (a):
 = 0.3, δ = 0.4 and (b):  = 0.0, δ = 0.4 (the latter provides better SSE
approximations, though requires longer computation time). The following ex-
periments were performed to evaluate efficiency and scalability of O2UCT.
• For each of WHG and WNZ instances (defined by game layout and T ) 15
trails of O2UCT were run and for each SEG 5 O2UCT tests were run.
Multiple trials were required due to stochastic nature of the method.
• For each WHG, WNZ and SEG instance and each of the MILP-based
methods (BC2015, C2016, CBK2018(a), CBK2018(b)) a single trial was
made (all methods are deterministic). Obtained results were used as a
baseline for O2UCT assessment.
All experiments were run on Intel Xeon Silver 4116 @ 2.10GHz with 256GB
RAM. Experiments involving O2UCT were run in parallel, each with 8GB RAM
assigned. The remaining tests were run in sequential manner with full memory
available to a single process. Each test was run with a time limit of 200 hours
and was forcibly terminated if did not finish within the allotted time or exceeded
available memory.
5 Results
Performance of O2UCT is analyzed in two dimensions: an expected Leader’s
payoff and time scalability. In both cases the results are presented separately for
WHG, WNZ and SEG and grouped by the number of nodes of an extensive-form
game |S ∪ Z|:
bucket = 10round(log10 |S∪Z|), (1)
where round rounds a number to the nearest integer. Consequently, games are
grouped by the orders of magnitude of game nodes. Such a grouping combines
two sources of game complexity: the structure of an underlying game graph and
the game length.
5.1 Payoffs
Fig. 7 presents the Leader’s payoffs averaged for all game instances in the respec-
tive benchmark sets, calculated at the end of each test against the worst-case
Follower (found by enumerative check among all possible Follower’s pure strate-
gies). Particular points are plotted if at least 70% of games from a given bucket
12
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Figure 7: The average Leader’s payoffs obtained by the tested methods for three
benchmark sets w.r.t. the number of game nodes. Plots are cut at the buckets
for which exact methods were still able to solve at least 70% of the respective
game instances within 200h time limit. In these borderline cases the average
payoffs are calculated for the subsets of solved games only.
were solved by a given method within allotted time. Otherwise the respective
points are omitted as their comparison would be meaningless. Plots of BC2015
and C2016 overlap as both refer to exact methods. Generally speaking, the
average Leader’s payoffs calculated by O2UCT are very close to optimal re-
sults while both variants of CBK2018 visibly diverge from optimal outcomes,
specifically for larger games.
In summary, we believe that the quality of strategies (the Leaders’s payoffs)
found by O2UCT are very encouraging, as the average results are only slightly
worse than the optimal ones, even for the most complex games.
5.2 Computation times
Computation time analysis is presented in Fig. 8. In the case of reaching com-
putation time limit for a given game instance, a value of 200h (time limit) was
used in place of the respective result (and averaged with the remaining times in
the bucket).
For small WHG and WNZ instances O2UCT is the slowest method, however
for larger games it starts to outperform MILP approaches. For the 107 bucket
O2UCT managed to solve all game instances (both WHG and WNZ) within
allotted time, CBK2018(a) solved 23 and 13 games of type WHG and WNZ,
respectively, while the remaining methods reached the time limit in almost all
cases.
For SEG games O2UCT was the slowest for instances with up to 106 nodes
but for 107 nodes its computation times are already the shortest since both
CBK2018 variants hit the time limit in at least 40% of the cases and BC2015
and C2016 did not solve a single instance.
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Figure 8: The average computation times for three benchmark sets. BC2015
and C2016 were unable to solve some WHG, SEG, WNZ game instances from
107, 107, 106 buckets, respectively due to hitting the time limit of 200h (marked
as a gray line). In such cases time limit value was used in place of the respective
computation time.
In summary, it can be observed in Fig. 8 that for small games the results are
in favor of MILP approaches, but for larger games MILP methods scale poorer
than O2UCT. While all considered methods scale exponentially, extrapolation
of results to yet bigger games suggests that O2UCT is the best-scaling methods
amongst the tested ones.
At the same time, it shouldn’t be forgotten that BC2015 and C2016 are
exact methods that yield theoretically guaranteed SSE utilities, while O2UCT
is only experimentally proven to yield optimal or close-to-optimal strategies.
While exact measurements of memory usage were not performed (it was
not possible because of using Java Virtual Machine and its garbage collection
facilities) we noted that O2UCT was able to compute results for 109 game
nodes using 8GB of memory while solver based methods started running out of
(256GB) memory for games with 107 nodes.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a novel double-oracle approach for approximating SSE strat-
egy in sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The
method does not rely on solving LP/MILP (which is the most common ap-
proach) but consists in iterative MCTS/UCT sampling of the Follower’s strategy
space alternated with adequate modification of the Leader’s behavior strategy.
Experimental evaluation shows that proposed approach provides high-quality
solutions (optimal in vast majority of the tests) and scales visibly better than
state-of-the-art MILP-based methods used for reference. Moreover O2UCT re-
quires substantially less memory resources and is therefore capable of solving
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more complex game instances. Lower memory requirement stems from two fac-
tors: application of a double oracle approach which does not require storing in
memory all possible strategy profiles simultaneously and dynamic expansion of
the Leader’s strategy tree – an approach similar in some aspects to the idea
of column generation in LP methods. However, what makes O2UCT distinct
from column generation is the use of a game-independent UCT metaheuristic
(instead of a game-specific heuristic) when searching for the most promising
moves.
Good time and memory scalability of O2UCT enables its application to
larger (than in the case of other approaches) game instances. Furthermore, it-
erative nature of the method allows an easy adjustment of a balance between
computation time and quality of results. The outer sampling procedure em-
ploys UCT, which is an anytime algorithm that can be stopped in any moment,
though still returning a high quality solution (the best one found so far). An any-
time property makes O2UCT particularly well suited to problems with strictly
allotted time for finding the Leader’s strategy.
The introduced method can be applied to any sequential game as it does not
depend on any specific game structure or game property.
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